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1. Introduction 
 
For more than a decade, political scientists have been involved in a lively debate on the 
concept of governance in general and on new modes of governance in particular. This 
debate was triggered by major political changes regarding the role of the state in shaping 
and transforming society. At national level, it was the decline of the intervention state and 
the increasing responsibility of non-state actors in public decision- and policy-making 
which gave rise to the concept of governance as a more cooperative mode of steering so-
ciety. In the international realm, the increasing importance of cooperation between states 
as well as between international and non-governmental organizations triggered the notion 
of governance as a mode of jointly providing common goods in the absence of govern-
ment. Yet to date, no clear definition or common understanding of the term ‘governance’ 
has emerged. Instead the debate, whether referring to national states or the international 
system, covers a broad range of highly diverging conceptualisations (see for example Pi-
erre 2000, Pierre and Peters 2005, Caporaso and Wittenbrink 2006). The spectrum 
reaches from a purely state-centred view on governance, equating the term more or less 
with governing or political steering (Treib et al. 2007), to a much broader definition fo-
cusing on the actions of and interrelationships between a plurality of public and private or 
societal actors and the institutional pattern underlying various modes of governance 
(Kooiman 1993).    2 
Against this background, it is the aim of this chapter to, first, clarify the concept of gov-
ernance, second, highlight basic modes of governance and their role in the EU and, third, 
develop an explanatory framework for the emergence of specific modes of governance in 
the framework of the EU-system. Two questions are central to this chapter: 
·  First, is the EU characterized by specific modes of governance and, if so, in which 
respect do they differ from modes of governance practiced at national level? 
·  Second, to which extent are European modes of governance shaped by the struc-
ture of the EU-system, its institutional setting and its procedures of decision-
making? 
 
In order to deal with these issues and questions, this chapter is structured as follows. 
First, a brief outline is given on the debate on (new) modes of governance and its origins 
as well as its significance in EU-research. This is followed, second, by a clarification of 
the term governance and a distinction between four basic modes of governance, constitut-
ing ideal types. Then, third, the focus is on how, why and to what extent these types of 
governance play a role in the EU-system and which modifications they undergo as com-
pared to governance at national level. Furthermore, it will be discussed in which sense 
European modes of governance can be termed as ‘new’. Fourth, an explanatory frame-
work will be developed by focusing on how different modes of governance evolve in the 
process of European policy-making and how they are shaped and modelled by the struc-
ture of the EU-system, its institutional setting and its procedures of decision-making. Fi-
nally, conclusions will be drawn with regard to the analysis of governance and policy-
making in the EU. 
 
 
2. Modes of governance: the origins of the debate 
 
The theoretical discussion on (new) modes of governance had its origin in two different 
sets of debates. The first, which I term the ‘governance without government’ debate, was 
initiated by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992, see in particular Rosenau 1992) with regard to 
international relations or, more specifically, to order in world politics. In his seminal arti-  3 
cle, Rosenau argued that, although a global public regime let alone a world government 
does not exist, some kind of order is being established. It results from cooperation among 
states, creating international regimes, and the interaction between a plurality of actors, 
both public and private or non-governmental, pursuing different objectives, but all con-
tributing to provide common goods and thus to establish order in a globalizing world.  
 
The second debate is rooted in research on changes in statehood at national level (Benz 
2004a). In this context, the emergence of new or alternative modes of governance is seen 
as a reaction to a declining capacity of the state to direct economic growth and social 
progress and to solve complex problems of modern societies. In this debate, it is assumed 
that public regulation and intervention is increasingly being shared  with or partly dele-
gated to private or non-governmental actors. This in turn requires coordination between 
different actors, thus shifting the mode of governance from hierarchy to cooperation, 
from regulation to delegated self-regulation, from top-down political steering to horizon-
tal coordination. Both debates have in common that they contest the exclusive role of the 
state in providing common goods and shaping public order, whether within states or in 
the international realm.  
 
The arguments of both debates are particularly suited for application to the EU. Like the 
international system, the EU lacks an institutionalized government or a dominant actor 
for decision-making, but it is nevertheless able to establish a dense web of rules and pro-
cedures guiding the behaviour of member states, and, unlike the international system, it is 
able to some extent to enforce compliance with the rules. As compared to national states, 
the EU is less characterized by a declining capacity of intervention but rather by the lack 
of such a capacity. In general, its competences to intervene directly into economic and 
societal developments are limited. Above all, it directs the behaviour of member states’ 
governments in order to achieve objectives defined at European level. Since the relation-
ships between European and national level are not structured as hierarchical, the Union is 
highly dependent on coordination of action and cooperation with national and sometimes 
also regional government level. The same applies to its relationships with private or non-
governmental actors. In sum, because of the characteristics of the EU-system, European   4 
governance is oriented on coordination of and cooperation with a wide variety of actors 
in order to achieve common goals rather than on the use of hierarchical means to direct 
their behaviour. Compared to the intervention state, which until recently was the domi-
nant mode of shaping national political systems (Jessop 2003), the EU is characterized by 
modes of governance based on softer or more indirect means of achieving its policy ob-
jectives. 
 
Thus, by its application to the EU, both above-mentioned debates merged into one, focus-
ing on the emergence of governance without government and on alternative modes of 
governance, characterized by coordination of and cooperation between government levels 
and between public and private or non-governmental actors. These forms of coordinative 
and cooperative governance were mostly seen as having emerged quite recently, in par-
ticular as a reaction to member states’ reluctance to further transfer powers and compe-
tences to the European level. Therefore, they were often discussed under the label new 
modes of governance (Héritier 2002). Some scholars assume that these new modes of 
governance characterize only a transitional stage in the integration process until member 
states are ready to create a more powerful system at European level. Others however 
claim that coordinative modes of governance are particularly suited to and inherently 
linked with the systemic structure of the EU-system. This latter view will further be 
elaborated in this chapter. 
 
 
3. Modes of governance; a typology  
 
In following Rosenau (1992) and Mayntz (2002, 2004, 2005; see also Benz 2004 b and 
c), governance is to be defined in broad terms, distinguishing it clearly from governing, 
or political steering. Whereas the latter terms refer to strategic actions of the state or pub-
lic authorities in order to intervene into the economic and societal sphere, governance re-
fers to the overarching modes of providing common goods or establishing public order, 
resulting from the interaction between various categories of actors and from forms of co-
ordination of their behaviour. Thus governance, in contrast to government, refers to vari-  5 
ous actors contributing to establish public order through taking decisions and/or actions 
for the common good. Governance is based on a system of rule(s), shaping and coordinat-
ing the behaviour of actors (Rosenau 1992). The term has two dimensions: on the one 
hand it refers to a process; on the other hand it refers to the underlying regulatory struc-
ture (Mayntz 2004, Börzel 2005). Governance as a process encompasses various modes 
of coordinating the behaviour of different actors. Governance in its structural dimension 
refers to the actors involved in the process and thus to an institutional setting underlying 
and shaping its various forms. 
 
In looking first at the process dimension of governance, different categories or modes of 
governance can be distinguished. In the literature on the issue, a wide variety of proposals 
on how to categorize modes of governance coexists. The variety refers to the number of 
categories, ranging from 3 to 17; to the defining criteria, referring to either the process or 
the structural dimension of governance or to both; and, sometimes, to the actor constella-
tion and/or the procedures being used (i.e. the Open Method of Coordination). Moreover, 
the degree of abstraction also varies widely within and between such typologies. 
 
In partly relying on, but also diverging from this literature, I present below four catego-
ries, constituting basic modes of governance as different modes of coordinating the be-
haviour of actors. These are the following: 
·  hierarchy, 
·  negotiation, 
·  competition, 
·  cooperation. 
 
These four categories are exhaustive and, at the same time, mutually exclusive. They re-
fer to different processes of shaping the relationships between public and private or non-
governmental actors, thus coordinating their behaviour in specific ways.  
 
With regard to the structural dimension of governance, it is the institutions and actors in-
volved in the process which form its basic constituents. In the first place, the state or pub-  6 
lic authorities play the most prominent role in structuring governance (Pierre and Peters 
2005). However, private or non-state actors are increasingly being involved. They may 
also exercise governance without direct interference of the public sphere, thus establish-
ing order through self-regulation (Zürn 2005). The institutional setting structuring the re-
lationships between actors can widely vary according to the level of governance (interna-
tional, national or regional/local) and to the relationships between the political, the eco-
nomic and the societal sphere. In looking at modes of governance under an actor-
perspective, the interdependence between the two becomes obvious: according to the ac-
tors being involved, modes of governance vary and vice versa. 
 
In the following, I will briefly describe the four modes of governance in more concrete 
terms, referring to both the process and the structural dimension as well as to the actors 
involved and the relationships between them. 
·  Thus hierarchy as a mode of governance is usually associated with the state, in 
particular the sovereign state, exercising power over individual citizens or society 
as a whole. Hierarchy in modern states is primarily exercised by legislation and 
rule-making or by taking binding decisions, accompanied by powers and action to 
enforce compliance. 
·  Negotiation by contrast supposes the interaction of various types of actors. This 
can range from exclusively public actors of different government levels and func-
tional sectors to a combination of public and private or non-state actors as well as 
to exclusively private or non-state actors. Negotiation is the preferred mode of 
governance for accommodating highly divergent interests among the actors in-
volved. Negotiations can result in binding decisions or even in formal contracts, 
but they are usually not accompanied by hard sanctions. 
·  Whereas both hierarchy and negotiation refer to processes of decision-making 
and/or rule-setting, competition as a mode of governance refers to a mechanism 
affecting the decisions of individual actors and thus coordinating their behaviour. 
However, competition does not emerge by itself but has to be established and sus-
tained by defining the rules of the game and guaranteeing their validity and effec-
tiveness. This means it is for a large part, although behind the scene, dependent on   7 
government or public authority creating and maintaining the regulatory frame-
work. At the same time, it relies on individual actors accepting the rules and com-
plying with the ensuing mechanisms. This implies that compliance, in contrast to 
hierarchy, is not being enforced but triggered by more or less strong incentives as 
well as disincentives.  
·  Cooperation for its part encompasses a plurality of actors and a wide variety of 
measures aimed at guiding their behaviour. It does not at all rely on coercion, but 
is based on voluntary participation in a cooperative process. This implies that 
compliance with jointly taken decisions, common agreements or only jointly held 
beliefs is also voluntary. Thus compliance is not guaranteed; a larger degree of 
non-compliance is highly probable. However, some scholars expect compliance to 
be even higher, since actors have voluntarily agreed upon common objectives or 
measures to be taken and, because of conviction, will be more inclined to imple-
ment them. Cooperation, therefore, is a mode of governance with highly contin-
gent outcomes; its effectiveness may vary according to the actors involved, the 
degree of their commitment, external circumstances and specific favouring condi-
tions. 
 
The four basic modes of governance, as defined above, constitute ideal types. In practice, 
they are often combined with each other or used in hybrid forms. However, the extent and 
the combinations of their use have not been stable through history. Thus, most scholars of 
the governance-approach assume that in recent times a major shift has occurred away 
from hierarchy as traditional and most widely used mode of governance towards new or 
softer modes of governance. The latter are assumed to include, to a much higher degree 
than in the past, non-state actors into the process of governance and to make use of indi-
rect means for directing the behaviour of actors. 
 
This shift is being explained, on the one hand, as a consequence of processes of global-
ization, altering the balance between national governments and international organiza-
tions and regimes at the expense of the former and also the balance between public and 
private or non-state actors. On the other hand, processes within states as a consequence of   8 
the internationalization of the economy and an increasing differentiation of societies, 
transforming the state-economy and the state-society relationship, are seen as its cause. In 
both cases, the state is no longer seen as being the exclusive actor responsible for provid-
ing public goods (see Benz 2004a). 
 
Although there is no clear consensus in the literature, new modes of governance are often 
characterized as non-binding decisions, voluntary agreements, non-formalized procedures 
of consensus-building and, more in general, as procedures for coordinating the behaviour 
of different actors, both public and private or non-governmental (Héritier 2002, Eberlein 
and Kerwer 2004). In other words: new modes of governance are conceived of as soft 
modes of governance, since they do not rely primarily on formal powers and authority or 
on established mechanisms and procedures to enforce compliance. 
 
The notion of new modes of governance however does not imply that these modes were 
invented right now or yesterday. It rather refers to their increasing use and significance, 
as well as their growing independence from the “shadow of hierarchy”. This increasing 
significance in turn is linked to the decreasing capacities of states in shaping exclusively 
the economic and social development of their territories. Thus, what is new about new 
modes of governance is the phenomenon that governance can successfully be exercised 
without relying exclusively or predominantly on the authority of the state. Against this 
background, it is obvious why new modes of governance have become such a salient is-
sue for the study of the European Union, a political system lacking the powers and the 
sovereignty of a national state, yet, directing successfully the behaviour of member states 
and non-state actors. 
 
 
4. Governance in the EU 
 
In looking at the dominant modes of governance characterizing the EU, it is important to 
note that the four basic categories presented above all play a significant role. However, 
there are substantial variations as compared to the practice of governance within states.   9 
First, every mode of governance differs in both its process and its structural dimension 
from the corresponding modes at national level; second, the mix of modes of governance 
in the Union differs from that of the member states.  
 
In the following, I will first give a brief sketch of European modes of governance accord-
ing to the categories presented above and then, second, elaborate its specific characteris-
tics as compared to governance in national political systems. 
·  Hierarchy as a European mode of governance is primarily exercised through the 
legislative powers of the Union.  Some authors even claim that regulation in the 
form of legislation is the dominant mode of governance characterizing the EU-
system (Majone 1996, 2005). Hierarchy plays also a role in decisions at European 
level, i.e. those of the Commission, the European Court of Justice or the European 
Central Bank (ECB) (Scharpf 1999). Finally, hierarchy in the EU-system is often 
exercised in the member states following jointly taken decisions at European 
level. 
·  Negotiation, serving primarily to accommodate diverging interests of institutional 
actors, is the mode of governance pervading the whole EU-system. Some authors 
therefore speak of the EU as a negotiated order (Scharpf 1999). Extensive nego-
tiations not only precede every legislative act, but they also structure the process 
of policy-making and implementation. In many policy fields, it is merely through 
negotiations and the ensuing decisions that policy objectives and procedures of 
implementation are determined (see i.e. Tömmel 1994, Cram 1997). Negotiations 
structure the relationships between a wide variety of public actors both in the ver-
tical and horizontal direction as well as those between public and private or non-
governmental actors, thus creating a multi-level and multi-actor system of gov-
ernance (Marks 1993, Marks et al. 1996, Grande 2000, Marks and Hooghe 2001, 
Bache and Flinders 2004). 
·  Competition as a mode of governance plays a prominent role in the EU-system 
since the core project of European integration, the creation of the single market, 
focuses on establishing competitive relationships between economic actors and 
member states. Competitive mechanisms are crucial in order to induce mutual ad-  10 
aptation and policy convergence among member states (Knill and Lenschow 
2005). However, competitive mechanisms are not only being used for creating 
and extending a common market, but also, in the form of pseudo-market mecha-
nisms, for structuring the behaviour of actors in non-market driven sectors and 
spheres. For example, through peer reviews, member states or other institutional 
actors participating in such procedures are subject to the pressure of competition. 
Pseudo-market mechanisms are also put in place by providing incentives and dis-
incentives, i.e. in the form of subsidies or fines, for directing the behaviour of ac-
tors. 
·  Cooperation as a mode of governance plays a major and increasingly important 
role in the EU-system. Since it is based on voluntarism, it is primarily applied in 
those cases where the EU misses formal competences. It allows for a certain de-
gree of joint action and thus for circumventing the reluctance of member states to 
transfer powers to the EU (Schaefer 2005).To a growing degree however, it also 
complements other modes of governance in policy-fields were major competences 
are clearly transferred to the European level, i.e. competition policy. In both cases, 
since actors are more or less free in making their policy-choices within the 
framework of cooperation, it serves to accommodate divergent policy options and 
strategies of national governments and other actors involved. Furthermore, be-
cause it is independent of lengthy procedures of formal decision-making, coopera-
tion also serves to quickly adapt policy-making to changing circumstances and 
needs. 
 
To what extent are European modes of governance differing from those practiced at na-
tional level? In the context of the governance-debate on the EU, this question is not di-
rectly discussed; it rather figures under the label of new modes of governance, which are 
seen to play an increasingly important role in the EU-system (see for example the New 
Governance project funded by the EU). In these debates, new modes of governance are 
conceived of as soft modes of governance, based on the interaction between public and 
private or non-governmental actors. More in general, the term is applied to non-
legislative forms of governance (Héritier 2002). The EU, because of its limited formal   11 
competences and its lack of sovereignty, is thought to be particularly prone to the emer-
gence of such modes of governance. This notion, on the one hand, is confirmed by actual 
changes in European governance, in particular the introduction of the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) constituting, at least partly, a particularly soft mode of governance. 
On the other hand, it is triggered by the very nature of the EU-system and the perception 
of this system as representing the current shift in public steering from state-centred activ-
ity to a more coordinative and cooperative approach, including not only different levels 
of public authority from local to European, but also non-state actors on all these levels.  
 
However, there is deep disagreement in the literature on the importance of new or soft 
modes of governance in the EU. Whereas some authors claim that such modes of govern-
ance play an increasingly significant role and even foresee that they might, in the longer 
run, replace hierarchy as a mode of governance, others stress that the EU continues to 
rely on traditional modes of hierarchical steering. Some even claim that the EU, more 
than national states, depends on such modes of steering. To date, although some quantita-
tive studies have been performed, it is impossible to give an empirically based answer to 
this dispute. This is not only the case because of a lack of precise data; but it also follows 
from the conceptualization of the research question, which does not allow for clearly dis-
tinguishing between the EU and its member states. Indeed, new or soft modes of govern-
ance are also increasingly practiced at national level; moreover, they are not really new in 
the sense that they were invented right now or yesterday, but they always pervaded sys-
tems of governance. What has changed in recent times is the increasing use of such 
modes of governance in institutionalized form at both the national and the European 
level. Whether this increase is more significant in the EU or in national states is hard to 
determine. What, however, can be determined is the nature of European modes of gov-
ernance as compared to those at national level. 
 
Therefore, in following, but also partly contrasting the above-mentioned views, I argue 
here that all modes of governance of the EU, that is, negotiation, competition, coordina-
tion and even hierarchy, are comparatively new ones in the sense that they are all based 
on relatively softer means of steering as well as on cooperation and coordination between   12 
various government levels and actors in order to reach jointly defined policy objectives. 
This reliance on softer and more cooperative modes of governance is inherently linked to 
the structure of the EU-system, which is, in the first place, a multi-level structure but also 
a multi-actor structure (Marks 1993, Marks et al. 1996, Cram 1997, Grande 2000, Marks 
and Hooghe 2001, Bache and Flinders 2004). (See section 5). 
 
The relatively softer nature of European governance becomes particularly obvious in the 
case of hierarchy, which is usually seen as a hard mode of governance linked to national 
sovereignty and the monopoly of power of the state. In the context of the EU-system, hi-
erarchy, that is legislation and its enforcement, implies a highly interactive process in-
cluding various public and private actors and, therefore, lacking the authority of rule-
making and enforcement at national level. Moreover, EU-rules in the form of legislation 
are less hierarchical or “softer” in their impact than those of nation states. The reasons for 
this difference are manifold. 
 
First, legislation at European level is precarious, because decisions are dependent on 
powerful actors with highly diverging interests and preferences, that is, they are depend-
ent on consensus in the Council which however is difficult to achieve (Scharpf 1999). 
This forms a general constraint on making use of legislation in the EU-system and it often 
leads to vaguely or ambiguously formulated rules (Majone 2005). Second, in most cases, 
European legislation in the form of directives has to be transposed into national legisla-
tion, which implies that it gives member states a high degree of discretion in the process 
of transposition (Falkner et al. 2005). As a consequence, it does not have a uniform im-
pact on the whole EU. Third, as mentioned above, European legislation is seldom accom-
panied by hard sanctions and clear procedures of enforcement, thus lacking the authority 
of national law (Hartlapp 2005). Fourth, European legislation is often framework legisla-
tion, aimed at creating procedures for guiding the behaviour of national and sometimes 
regional government instead of directly intervening in economic or social life. It thus has 
only an indirect impact which, again, may widely vary between member states (Jupille 
2004).  
   13 
In looking not only at legislation, but also at European decisions, a similar tendency to-
wards a softer impact can be discerned. For example, the European Commission has the 
powers to take binding decisions in competition matters. But in practice, such decisions 
are only taken after lengthy negotiations with all actors involved – member states’ gov-
ernments and private firms – accommodating their diverging interests and representing 
rather a compromise than a clear top-down decision. It is true that the European Court of 
Justice takes binding, authoritative decisions without compromising with the parties in-
volved. However, appealing to the Court implies cumbersome and costly procedures, so 
that only a limited number of cases are brought before the Court. Moreover, in most 
cases, the Court can only express a verdict; it has seldom sanctions at hand so that com-
pliance cannot be enforced. Binding decisions without interference of member states or 
other actors are also those taken by the ECB. However, this mode of procedure, laid 
down in the Treaties, is highly contested in public debates. To sum up, hierarchy as a 
European mode of governance, whether in the form of legislation or decisions, is often 
less hierarchical than it seems at first sight, in particular, if compared to traditional hier-
archical modes of governance at national level. Hierarchy as a mode of governance un-
dergoes transformation when applied in the context of the EU-system.  
 
The same applies, although to different degrees, to the other modes of governance. 
Thus negotiation, usually resulting in joint decision, also implies that these deci-
sions are less binding, in particular because member states and their governments often 
have to reconcile them with other objectives at national level. In case of contradictions, 
they are rather inclined to follow their national objectives than those agreed upon at 
European level. Decisions as a result of negotiations are not accompanied by sanctions or 
other procedures of enforcement. 
Competition, in contrast, is a mode of governance which may have a hard impact 
on all actors subject to it. Once in place as a mechanism regulating the market, it is rela-
tively independent of state or other public authority intervention. It is the market itself 
which sanctions or even rules out non-conforming performances. However, in case of 
pseudo-market mechanisms, there are seldom clear provisions for sanctions. It rather de-  14 
pends on the incentives and disincentives and their indirect impact whether actors will 
comply. 
Cooperation, by nature, is based on voluntarism and, therefore, its impact depends 
on the commitment of actors to European objectives and/or the perceived gains of their 
participation. But also in this case the impact of cooperation might be slightly softer than 
at national level since European voluntary agreements are usually seen as less binding. 
 
Having said that all European modes of governance except competition in market situa-
tions lack hard mechanisms of ensuring compliance or are less binding on member states 
or other actors involved, does not imply that compliance is not achieved at all. On the 
contrary, in the longer run, as actors get more sensitive to softer modes of governance and 
as they sense the advantages linked to them, compliance will more and more be ensured. 
Therefore, softer modes of governance are not by definition less effective but are more 
dependent on the acceptance of actors and their sensitivity to possible gains linked to 
compliance with them. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that all modes of governance being used in the EU are, in the 
widest sense of the term, to be considered as more or less new in that none of them forms 
simply a replica of modes of governance practiced at national level. Moreover, all Euro-
pean modes of governance, except competition in real market situations, are compara-
tively soft in their impact, although to a widely varying degree, with hierarchy figuring at 
one end of the spectrum and cooperation at the other. 
 
 
5. Governance and the nature of the EU-system  
 
In arguing that more or less all modes of governance in the EU-system are specific in that 
they are comparatively soft in both their procedures and their impact, the most salient is-
sue is whether and in which way these modes of governance are interrelated with the 
structure of the EU-system. To tackle this question, the point of departure is a neo-
institutionalist perspective on the EU and, more precisely, an actor-centred approach to   15 
neo-institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Under this perspective, it is assumed 
that the structure of the EU-system shapes the emergence of specific modes of govern-
ance and that the system offers incentives and constraints for their emergence. This how-
ever is not seen as a deterministic relationship between the EU-system and its modes of 
governance. Instead, it is assumed that the EU-system provides an opportunity structure 
for actors to foster certain developments in policy-making, while others are discouraged. 
Thus modes of governance emerge from the actions and interactions of institutional ac-
tors in the process of policy-making. Against this background, I will in the following, 
first, briefly define the structure of the EU-system and then, second, highlight the incen-
tives and constraints that the system sets for the emergence of specific modes of govern-
ance. 
 
The most prominent characteristic of the EU-system is its hybrid form, generally de-
scribed as a mixture of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. These terms how-
ever, often used as a dichotomy, are misleading in that they refer to different institutional 
categories and to contradicting theoretical strands. Therefore, I prefer to characterize the 
EU as a system reflecting two principles underlying its institutional structure, the Euro-
pean and the national principle (Tömmel 2006; see also Beck and Grande 2004, Majone 
2005). This constellation finds its institutional expression in both a horizontal fragmenta-
tion of power at the European level and a vertical fragmentation of power between the 
European and the national level. In the horizontal dimension at European level, the two 
principles find primarily their expression in the Commission representing the Union and 
the Council representing the member states. Both institutions, forming the principal cen-
tres of power in the EU-system, constitute a bicephalous structure, this in contrast to na-
tional political systems which are more clearly centralized. All other institutions and ac-
tors of the system, although taking varying positions in concrete decision-making, are 
structurally related to one or the other side of these centres of power. Thus, the Commis-
sion is often supported by Parliament and the Court, while the Council has its own sup-
porting substructure, i.e. COREPER, various special Committees, the Council secretariat 
and the working groups. In the vertical dimension, the European principle is represented 
by the Commission, supported in this constellation by the Council and/or the Court, on   16 
the one hand, and by the individual member states on the other. Since the Council takes 
decisions on policy objectives and the overall process of integration, it has vis-à-vis sin-
gle member states an important role in guiding their behaviour. The Court, because of its 
role in infringement procedures against member states, represents directly the European 
principle. 
 
The relationship between the institutions and actors representing these principles is not 
definitively defined, for example by a clear division of powers, let alone by attributing 
sovereignty to one side of them or by clearly defining a structure of shared sovereignty. It 
is true that member states are sovereign, but only individually and only to the extent that 
this sovereignty is not constrained by rule-making at European level. In the context of the 
EU-system, in order to be able to exercise power, member states have to pool their sover-
eignty. This pooling however is not once and for all established, or delegated to the 
Commission, but it depends on decision-making and consensus-building in the Council 
and, therefore, it is precarious. 
 
The European level, and in particular the Commission, has been attributed certain compe-
tences, but they do not allow for taking independent action. The Commission, through its 
monopoly of proposing legislation, can set the agenda and shape to a far-reaching degree 
the substance of legislation; but, in the end, it is always dependent on the Council taking 
the respective decisions. The Court, by using its judicial powers to a maximum, has es-
tablished its position as final arbiter in the EU-system through its own judgements. How-
ever, as the most recent judgements in competition matters prove, it is also sensible to 
indirect pressures from the member states. Thus, the distribution of powers in the EU-
system is continuously being structured and re-structured through ongoing processes of 
decision-making, consensus-building, conflict and cooperation. The central institutional 
actors, in particular the Commission and the Council as well as the Commission and indi-
vidual governments of the member states, are continuously involved in negotiations de-
termining their respective role and influence in every policy-field. It is through this con-
tinuous interaction that European modes of governance evolve and are further modelled. 
   17 
Against the background of this necessarily rough characterization of the EU-system, the 
major incentives and constraints which the structure of the system sets to the use of spe-
cific modes of governance can be determined. Major constraints lay in the following: 
·  Since the EU is not sovereign, it is constrained in making use of hierarchy as a 
mode of governance. Although it has legislative powers, the use of these powers 
depends largely on decision-making in the Council. Decision-making in the 
Council is precarious because of diversity among member states and because of a 
general reluctance of all member states to transfer powers and competences to the 
European level. 
·  The EU is constrained in enforcing compliance with its rules. It does not have ma-
jor competences in rule-enforcement, let alone the powers of command and con-
trol vis-à-vis the member states. Since member-states are sovereign, they have 
many means and ways at their disposal to resist to or even obstruct various modes 
of exercising power by the European level. 
 
Major incentives lay in the following: 
·  Since the EU-system is characterized by the fragmentation of powers between in-
stitutional actors with highly diverging interests, it offers incentives for both ag-
gregating or transforming diverging interests and preferences. This in turn fosters 
the emergence of modes of governance based on negotiations, consensus- build-
ing and cooperation among different actors.  
·  Insofar as powers have been transferred to the European level, these powers 
mostly refer to the building and ensuring of effectiveness of market mechanisms. 
Therefore, and in combination with the otherwise limited powers of the EU, the 
system offers strong incentives for using market mechanisms and competition as 
modes of governance, also beyond the realm of the real market. 
·  Since the EU-system lacks far-reaching powers in many policy-fields and, there-
fore, is highly dependent on external power resources, it offers strong incentives 
for including a wide variety of actors, both public and private or non-
governmental, into its procedures of decision-making and policy-implementation.   18 
This in turn stimulates the “invention” of procedures for fostering consensus-
building among the actors involved, leading to convergence of visions, norms, at-
titudes and preferences. 
 
In sum, on the one hand, the “weak” and contradictory structure of the EU-system and its 
dependence on national governments is the main factor constraining the use of hierarchi-
cal modes of governance and thus the exercise of power and authority in traditional 
forms. On the other hand, it is precisely this weak and contradictory structure that fosters 
the emergence of alternative modes of governance based on the use of market mecha-
nisms and competition, negotiation and cooperation as means of directing the behaviour 
of actors towards achieving commonly defined objectives. 
 
Incentives and constraints shaping the emergence of European modes of governance are 
embedded in the structure of the EU-system. This however does not imply that they de-
termine the emergence of modes of governance. It is the actors in the system, their 
choices and their interactions in the framework of incentives and constraints, who ulti-
mately determine which modes of governance emerge in which form and to which extent. 
This becomes most obvious when looking at the evolution of European integration. In the 
beginning, this process was characterized by taking recourse to hierarchy as a mode of 
governance, but it had often only a limited impact. Moreover, it turned out to be difficult 
to extend to further policy-fields. It was only after this stalemate had been realized that 
actors turned to a more differentiated and sophisticated approach in governance, leading 
to the emergence of ever softer modes of steering and coordinating the behaviour of ac-
tors. Moreover, together with these changes, a more deliberate approach to include non-
state actors into European policy-making evolved, increasing the significance of coopera-
tive and coordinative modes of governance. Therefore, we can conclude that European 
modes of governance are on the one hand shaped by the structure of the EU-system, in 
that it prefigures the interactions of institutional actors. But, on the other, it is the choices 
of and the struggles between these actors which shape European governance in its spe-
cific form. 
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6. Conclusions  
Against the background of the theoretical framework as outlined above, some conclu-
sions can be formulated with regard to (new) modes of governance in the EU: 
·  First, the so-called new modes of governance did not emerge in recent years; they 
have been present in the EU-system since its inception, although in much less 
pronounced, less differentiated and less institutionalized forms. However, they re-
cently became more visible because of their increased use, their increasing degree 
of softness, their dominance in new policy fields and because of explicit reference 
to them in decisions and official documents of the EU. 
·  European modes of governance do not emerge by design but are the result of the 
process of policy-making, evolving through the interaction between different in-
stitutions at European level and between the European and national (and some-
times regional) government level and the actors representing them. They are 
shaped and modelled according to the incentives and constraints which the institu-
tional structure of the EU sets to their emergence and evolution. European modes 
of governance, therefore, are inherently linked to the systemic structure of the EU. 
·  Single European policy-fields are not characterized by specific modes of govern-
ance. Although policy-fields may differ in the use of modes of governance and 
their combinations, they are not differentiated according to categories of govern-
ance. Since modes of governance in the EU-system result from interaction, char-
acterized, across all policy-fields, by conflict and cooperation between institu-
tional actors, all policy-fields show a specific and – over time – changing mix of 
modes of governance. 
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